Kudiwave Technologies Ltd. is facing mounting questions over the ownership, control and beneficial use of a PalmPay account that police investigators allege received ₦750 million traced to a suspected digital-banking fraud.
The dispute, which has prompted protests at PalmPay’s Lagos office and a series of court applications, is increasingly focused on a basic issue: who opened, controlled and was authorized to operate the Kudiwave account into which the disputed funds were transferred?
The company (Kudiwave) has challenged the transfer of about ₦750.37 million from its PalmPay account into a designated Police Special Fraud Unit recovery account.
But police investigators have found that that the funds were laundered through various accounts and banks in a spate of 24 hours, and ultimately ended up in the account of Kudiwave Technologies at PalmPay.
The competing claims have not been finally determined by a court.
The account-owner question
According to sources familiar with the investigation, the Nigeria Inter-Bank Settlement System Plc, (NIBSS) and the Police Special Fraud Unit (SFU) traced the allegedly fraudulent funds through a series of bank accounts before they reached a PalmPay account held in Kudiwave Technologies’ name.
The money reportedly moved into the account in three transfers of approximately ₦250 million each, occurring on the same day and at nearly the same time.
Banking sources say that, the pattern of transfers—large, rapid and closely timed incoming credits—is the kind of transaction sequence that would ordinarily draw scrutiny under anti-money-laundering, fraud-monitoring and suspicious-transaction frameworks.
Police officers also visited the address supplied in the KYC documentation and could not locate the stated premises. Meanwhile people familiar with the investigation said a man who presented himself as Kudiwave’s company secretary at the SFU notified the police that the person who opened or signed for the account had travelled, meanwhile the purported account owner has not subsequently appeared before the SFU.
The complex nature of the alleged crime explains why investigators may view the account’s ownership and control as a central issue rather than a technical dispute over a PalmPay debit.
Court order, recovery account
Public news reports indicate that the Police Special Fraud Unit obtained a Federal High Court order requiring PalmPay to disclose the account balance and transfer or recover the disputed money into a Nigeria Police Force Microfinance Bank exhibit or recovery account.
On that account, the available evidence points toward a law-enforcement preservation mechanism rather than an independent claim by the Police Microfinance Bank to the money.
The Police Microfinance Bank account was reportedly identified as an SFU exhibit account—a controlled account used to hold disputed money pending the outcome of investigation and court processes. That is materially different from a private beneficiary account or a commercial account controlled for ordinary banking transactions.
This in essence means that the police cannot make the funds disappear as alleged, experts said.
Based on that information, the Lagos Police Command and Police Microfinance Bank appear to have been involved in the recovery process in response to an SFU investigation and court directives.
Their stated role was to preserve the funds and support the effort to identify the original source, trace the transaction chain and determine the lawful owner.
PalmPay’s position
PalmPay has become the visible target of the dispute because it held the Kudiwave account and implemented the restriction and reported transfer. But the company’s role must be assessed against the legal instructions it received.
Public news reports say PalmPay was directed to freeze, disclose and transfer funds under a court order linked to the SFU investigation. Kudiwave has disputed the transaction and sought a reconciliation, including account activity, supporting instructions and details of the beneficiary account.
That does not mean PalmPay is beyond scrutiny. Financial institutions must be able to show that they acted within the four corners of a valid order, maintained proper records, protected account-holder rights and responded correctly if a ruling was later varied, vacated or stayed.
But the evidence currently described does not support a simple characterization of PalmPay as having unilaterally removed a customer’s money. The key question is whether the payment service provider acted in compliance with an SFU-led process and judicial orders.
The Matter still before the courts
The case has taken several procedural turns. First the SFU obtained an initial order allowing the funds to be recovered into its exhibit account.
Kudiwave later challenged the order, arguing it had not been served with the underlying application, then a Federal High Court vacated the recovery order on service-related grounds.
The Police appealed the decision and sought a stay of execution, meanwhile Kudiwave separately pursued a fundamental-rights action in Abuja.
The Police have now filed criminal charges against persons they consider connected to the alleged fraud.
These steps mean the case is ongoing and no final judicial ruling has been cited establishing that Kudiwave is innocent, that the funds belong to Kudiwave, or that police investigators, PalmPay or Police Microfinance Bank acted unlawfully.
Legal experts said the correct forum for resolving those issues is the courts, supported by transaction data, KYC evidence, testimony from account signatories and the trace of the funds through the banking system.
Why banks must act against suspected fraud
Nigeria’s financial system has a strong public-interest reason to respond rapidly when fraud is suspected.
Nigerian financial institutions lost an estimated ₦25.85 billion to electronic-payment fraud in 2025, while cumulative losses between 2020 and 2025 reached ₦134.48 billion, according to data from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Nigeria Inter-Bank Settlement System Plc (NIBSS).
The Kudiwave case highlights a difficult balance. Banks, fintech companies, NIBSS and law-enforcement agencies must act quickly enough to freeze and trace suspected criminal proceeds before money disappears through multiple accounts.
At the same time, they must observe court procedures, retain a complete audit trail and give affected account holders a lawful route to challenge restrictions.
If institutions wait until every ownership dispute is settled before freezing suspicious inflows, alleged fraud proceeds can be dispersed beyond recovery within hours.
The protesters’ narrative focuses on a ₦750 million debit from a PalmPay account; however, the broader investigative record raises a more fundamental issue: who owned and controlled the Kudiwave account that received the allegedly fraud-linked funds, and who can establish a legitimate claim to the money?
Legal experts say that until the named account opener, signatory and beneficial owner are identified and provide verifiable documentation, the ownership question will remain central.
The available account of events suggests the SFU recovery mechanism and Police Microfinance Bank were seeking to preserve contested funds while investigators followed the fraud trail, not acting as private claimants to the money.
The final answer will depend on evidence presented in court—not protests, social-media campaigns or competing public statements.
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